For decades, the European Union ran on an unspoken understanding: Germany handled the money, France handled the military. Now, the tables are turning.

As Germany aims to become Europe’s predominant military power, the political balance is shifting. In France, there’s a scramble to stay relevant, while in Poland, Germany’s rearmament is stirring old ghosts and creating a sense that a Berlin-Warsaw alliance might be the most effective way to keep Russia at bay.

“Everywhere I go in the world, from the Baltics to Asia, people are asking Germany to take on more responsibility,” said Christoph Schmid, a German Social Democratic lawmaker on the Bundestag’s defense committee. “The expectation is that Germany will finally step up and match its economic weight with defense power.”

A Germany with Europe’s largest army, equipped with cutting edge tanks, missiles and jets, is a far cry from the shambolic Bundeswehr derided for its low morale and outdated equipment. That military power is tied to political and economic heft — and Europe will have to adapt to a dominant Germany.

By 2029, Germany is expected to spend €153 billion a year on defense. That’s about 3.5 percent of GDP, the country’s most ambitious military expansion since reunification. France, by comparison, plans to reach about €80 billion by 2030. 

Poland aims to spend 186 billion złoty (€44 billion) on defense this year, equal to 4.7 percent of GDP — the highest level in NATO — and plans to have one of Europe’s largest and best-equipped militaries.

The fiscal realities are changing, too. With Paris struggling with debt above 110 percent of GDP and a deficit north of 5 percent, Berlin’s borrowing power gives it freedom that its neighbors can only envy. Poland is also fighting to keep public spending under control, exacerbated by the explosion in defense spending.

One EU official called the shift in Germany’s military potential “telluric,” or Earth-moving. Another diplomat put it more directly: “It’s the most important thing happening right now at EU level.”

For Europe’s diplomats, that surge raises more than budgetary questions. It challenges the story the bloc has long told itself about who guards its security. And that question is making the rounds in Brussels, where officials are wondering how “European” Germany’s buildup will really be.

Berlin builds big and local

One sign of the answer lies in procurement. Berlin remains deeply protective of its national prerogatives in defense. 

It has resisted giving the European Commission a stronger hand in buying weapons and plans to rely heavily on national frameworks, including a new procurement law that will make systematic use of Article 346 of the EU treaty. This clause allows countries to bypass EU competition rules to favor domestic contracts.

That Germany first approach is already taking shape.

Internal procurement papers seen by POLITICO show Berlin preparing to push €83 billion in defense contracts through the Bundestag by the end of 2026. That’s an unprecedented surge touching every area of the armed forces, from tanks and frigates to drones, satellites and radar systems.

And that’s only the opening phase. Behind it sits a much larger €377 billion Bundeswehr “wish list,” a long-term blueprint covering more than 320 new weapons programs across all military domains.

Even more striking is where the billions will flow. According to the procurement plans, less than 10 percent of new contracts are going to U.S. suppliers — a reversal after years in which Berlin was one of Washington’s top defense customers. Nearly all the rest will stay in Europe, and much of it with Germany’s own defense industry.

For Europe, that means the EU’s economic engine is becoming its defense-industrial one too, with Berlin channeling hundreds of billions into domestic production lines while France and southern countries remain fiscally constrained.

France feels uneasy

That shift is being felt in Paris, where Germany’s rearmament is viewed with a mix of skepticism and concern.

“In France, the defense apparatus is at the core of the system,” said one EU official. “The difference between Paris and Berlin is that in France any official is, at the end, a defense official.”

Despite French President Emmanuel Macron’s push since 2017 to improve the Franco-German relationship, mistrust toward Berlin remains deeply rooted in French defense circles.

“It’s halfway between vigilance and threat,” one French defense official told POLITICO. “It will be difficult to work with them because they will be extremely dominant,” the official said, adding that the main caveat is whether German Chancellor Friedrich Merz will manage to fill the Bundeswehr’s personnel gaps.

However, Germany’s industrial and economic might is as much of a concern as the country’s rearmament, the official continued. “They won’t need to invade Alsace and Moselle,” they joked, referring to the French regions that Germany successfully invaded during its conquest of France in 1940. “They can just buy it.”

Beyond the historical unease, French and European officials wonder what kind of geopolitical role Berlin under Merz’s leadership intends to play.

“It’s unclear yet what Merz wants to do,” said one Paris-based European diplomat. “Germany will have to take on a broader role internationally, but it’s unclear how.”

The latest friction over Europe’s next-generation fighter jet project — the Future Combat Air System, or FCAS — has only deepened the unease.

The €100 billion program was meant to be the crown jewel of Franco-German-Spanish defense cooperation. But delays and squabbling over which country gets a larger share of the work are testing that partnership to the breaking point.

In recent weeks, German defense officials have floated fallback options, exploring potential cooperation with Sweden or the U.K., or pressing ahead with Spain alone.

That prospect is alarming Paris. 

For France, FCAS is more of a political project than just another procurement project. It’s tied directly to its nuclear deterrent, a fundamental aspect of its claim to European military leadership. Éric Trappier, the CEO of Dassault Aviation, which is to play a leading role in FCAS, was blunt with French lawmakers: “I’m not against the project, but when Germany says it’s going to exclude France, doesn’t that bother you?”

If Berlin spends big while teaming up mainly with Nordic and eastern allies, Paris risks losing the central role it has long enjoyed in Europe’s defense architecture.

Poland’s wary approval

However, not everyone sees Germany’s rearmament as a threat. In Warsaw, it’s viewed as both necessary and overdue.

“Poland has become a shining beacon among NATO allies in terms of military spending,” said Marek Magierowski, a former Polish ambassador to Israel and the United States. “Consequently, we insist that other partners follow suit. But if we seriously care about collective defense, we cannot keep saying: ‘Please, everybody spend more on defense. But not you, Germany.’”

A group of Polish officials who spoke with POLITICO expressed similar pragmatism. “They’re rowing in the right direction,” one said. “From our point of view, it could have been done earlier, but it’s good that it’s happening.”

But the often bloody past casts a long shadow. 

“Looking at history, a situation where Germany would link its economic power with military might has always raised fears,” said Paweł Zalewski, Poland’s deputy defense minister. “Today, Poland has the largest land army in Europe and will be a very strong player in the future, so the modernization plans of the Bundeswehr have to be taken in context. All European countries are rearming.”

Zalewski pointed out that Germany’s buildup comes as Washington signals a drawdown of its European presence. “An increase in Germany’s military strength is a natural response,” he said. “The main countries defending the eastern flank will be Poland and Germany.”

However, old memories die hard in Warsaw, both from the war and from the policy of economic co-dependence with Russia pursued by former Chancellor Angela Merkel.

“We also remember Merkel’s pro-Russia stance,” Zalewski said. “We are calling on Germany to show how strongly it will defend the international order against Russia. There is a need for constant verification. We aren’t forgetting anything.”

Magierowski reflected that concern. “I am more worried about trade ties between Germany and Russia, still quite vivacious, and the growing pressure in Berlin to return to business as usual after the war in Ukraine.”

That softer line on Russia is most visible inside the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD), now the country’s second-largest party.

“When we think about the AfD and whether they could gain power or co-power in future German governments, this is a concern,” one Polish official said. “The AfD is pro-Putin and has a program that talks about regaining some Polish territory. We cannot open that discussion in Europe. The Second World War started because Germany was unhappy about the results of the First.”

A shifting center of gravity

Taken together, Germany’s rapid buildup and its partners’ mixed reactions highlight how Europe’s center of gravity is moving eastward. The continent’s economic powerhouse is now transforming into its military-industrial one, while France clings to its nuclear card and Poland grows into a conventional heavyweight on NATO’s eastern flank.

In Brussels, that realignment poses a test: Can the EU channel this momentum into common structures, or will it deepen the bloc’s defense fragmentation?

For now, Berlin’s buildup is seen as a return to responsibility rather than a bid for dominance. But even supporters admit the scale of the change is hard to grasp.

“It could be frightening, no doubt,” said one EU diplomat. “But Germany has coalitions. It’s in the EU and NATO — and many things could happen in the meantime.”