Jeremy Shapiro is research director and head of the Washington office of the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR).

The U.K. rolled out the red carpet for U.S. President Donald Trump last week, with the pomp and circumstance only a thousand-year monarchy can provide.

Replete with horse guards, carriage rides and ceremonial toasts, this state visit gave Trump precisely what he craves: spectacle and status. And in return, the president seemed exultant, full of smiles and lavish praise for his hosts, including the proclamation that “the bond between our countries is like no other anywhere in the world.”

His pleasure was no accident though — indeed, it was the entire point.

Since Trump’s return to the White House, America’s allies have converged on a common strategy for dealing with him: flatter, appease, distract. If leaders can indulge Trump’s vanity and create the grand occasions he loves, they can prevent angry outbursts, forestall punitive measures and generate positive headlines at home — or so their logic goes. And his state visit to the U.K. was a masterclass in alliance sycophancy creating a harmonious meeting and avoiding a blow-up.

But therein lies the trap. Flattery is a strategy for managing meetings — not for shaping policy.

There’s simply no evidence that flattering Trump produces better policy outcomes. On the contrary, it seems to encourage more demands. A smooth visit may generate a kind word or a nice tweet, but it doesn’t change the underlying trajectory of Trump’s approach.

Worse still, flattery isn’t without cost. It signals weakness. And in Trump’s transactional world, weakness isn’t forgiven — it’s exploited.

Of course, U.S. allies aren’t wrong to think flattery has tactical utility. Trump visibly delights in military parades, palace receptions and deferential speeches. French President Emmanuel Macron’s 2017 Bastille Day parade, former Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s sumo diplomacy in Tokyo, and Britain’s previous state banquet all demonstrated the same dynamic: It’s easy to have a good meeting with Trump.

But that’s where the benefits ends. The assumption that ego management can be transmuted into lasting policy gains is wrong. Trump isn’t moved by gestures intended to alter his interests or demands, and he quickly returns to extracting more concessions. Rather than a shield against pressure, a successful pageant is simply an invitation for more.

Britain should have learned this already from the EU’s experience. Just this July, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen traveled to Scotland to meet Trump, determined to calm tensions. She came armed with compliments, pledges to buy American products and warm affirmations of the transatlantic bond, and the meeting was immediately declared a triumph — even though it resulted in an uneven trade framework the bloc swore it would never accept. Trump praised von der Leyen personally and celebrated the agreement as a success of his trade policy, while Brussels congratulated itself on soothing the beast.

But the so-called victory was short-lived. Before the summer ended, Trump was already denouncing the EU’s Digital Services Act as “designed to harm, or discriminate against, American Technology” — an issue supposedly settled with the framework deal — and the U.S. was threatening new retaliatory tariffs.

Qatar offers an even more cautionary tale. The small oil-rich Gulf emirate arguably won the Trump flattery sweepstakes by giving the U.S. a staggering $400 million super-luxury aircraft to substitute for the aged Air Force One — perhaps the most extravagant gift ever offered by a U.S. ally. And it certainly generated a lot of warm words from Trump.

Yet, when Israel launched attacks on Hamas leadership in Doha, Washington looked the other way. The aircraft donation might have bought photo ops and handshakes, but it certainly didn’t buy the political cover Qatar needed to avoid having its capital bombed by America’s closest ally. The lesson was harsh: Appeasement wasn’t only ineffective, it was ruinously expensive.

Britain will probably soon face a similar reality. If anything, the U.K.’s ceremonial indulgence signaled to Trump just how much London fears his displeasure and, therefore, how much he can demand. It should also be noted that most of the U.S. investments in Starmer’s “Tech Prosperity Deal” announced during Trump’s visit were previously announced commercial decisions, bundled into a “deal” to coincide with Trump’s visit for political PR purposes.

Now, Washington will likely start turning the screws on London over its own proposed digital services tax. And Trump himself will probably remember all that flattery as he throws his support behind fellow traveler Nigel Farage’s ReformUK party in the next British election.

Of course, one might wonder why allies are persisting in their appeasement given the evidence.

Partly, out of fear. Leaders dread the immediate political fallout of a presidential tirade. A successful visit buys time, avoids headlines about a “failed summit” and reassures domestic audiences that relations with the U.S. — an important ally for all these countries — are under control.

But these are shallow victories. They soothe the press corps for a day while leaving the underlying problems unresolved. Worse, they create a cycle in which leaders trade ever-greater gestures of flattery for ever-smaller returns. The real cost of appeasement isn’t just humiliation but the erosion of leverage.

Allies need to understand that flattery isn’t a strategy — it’s a coping mechanism. Trump’s transactionalism can be dealt with, but only by collective, consistent and credible strength. Trump isn’t persuaded by flattery. He’s deterred by resolve.

For the EU, this means acting as a bloc rather than as individual nations currying favor. For smaller countries, it means setting clear redlines and refusing to accept punishment disguised as negotiation. And for the U.K., it means understanding that favors aren’t won by ceremonial banquets but by tangible commitments and reciprocal leverage.

The “flatter, appease, distract” strategy may produce the appearance of stability, but it creates a reality of vulnerability. Leaders congratulate themselves for surviving the meeting without a blow-up, only to find themselves diminished when the next round of demands arrives. The photo op is fleeting, and the loss of leverage endures.