Mark T. Kimmitt is a retired U.S. Army brigadier general and has also served as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Middle East Policy.

Despite the stern face portrayed on Iran’s government television, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei is facing the most significant challenge to his legitimacy since assuming power in 1989.

Indeed, the view from the supreme leader’s office Beit-e Rahbari must be quite parlous, with security forces gunning down peaceful protestors who took to the streets amid a collapsing economy, inflation out of control and a water catastrophe unseen in modern times. On top of that looms the threat of U.S. President Donald Trump, and the knowledge that Israel would be happy to assist in any move Washington might make.

Even Khamenei’s recent outreach toward the U.S. — a tried-and-true method to buy time and diminish expectations — doesn’t seem to be working this time.

But the ayatollah isn’t delusional, and must surely recognize he needs a lifeline. I believe he would do well to take one, and that Trump would do well to make such an offer.

The recent U.S. operation in Venezuela is perhaps instructive here. The U.S. isn’t seeking a change in the Venezuelan regime, merely a change in its behavior, and is prepared to maintain the status quo. However, unlike the vague threat of drugs, sanctions-busting oil sales or longstanding Chavismo in America’s backyard, the threats from Iran are specific, existential and have been consistent over the years.

A deal on those threats — Iran’s development of nuclear weapons, its missile program and its vast destabilizing proxy network — will be the terms of any perpetuation of the regime. And it must also include forgiveness for the protestors, protection of the right to peaceful future demonstrations, and the transparent prosecution of those responsible for killing unarmed civilians.

For the U.S., airstrikes against key regime targets should be considered, as without a kinetic demonstration of resolve, the regime may believe it can withstand Washington’s rhetorical pressure. Strikes would also be an opportunity to bring the Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and its paramilitary Basij elements responsible for the killing of thousands of protestors to justice, and to again hit missile and nuclear targets still recovering from the blows they took back in June.

But airstrikes also come with two major risks. The first is casualties and prisoners: Iran’s regime has a long history of hostage-taking, from the U.S. Embassy takeover in 1979 to the U.S. hostages incarcerated today. The risk of American troops rotting in Evin Prison is one Washington will want to avoid.

Second, airstrikes risk retaliation on U.S. bases within range of Iran’s vast rocket, missile and terrorist networks. The June 2025 attack on Al-Udeid Airbase in Qatar is a clear sign that Iran is able and willing to fire on the U.S., and in the current scenario a larger response and casualties should be expected.

Now let’s look at the terms of a possible deal. Before anything else, Iran’s nuclear weapons development program must cease. Despite all the talks, deals and commitments over the years, Iran has been able to evade a system of inspection, verification and penalties to ensure it lives up to its obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. This must be the unequivocal baseline of any lifeline to the regime and a precondition for any further discussions.

Next, the Iranian missile development program must also cease. For years, Iran has continued to produce long-range rockets and missiles at scale and proliferate them across the region. This allowed the Houthis to block the Red Sea and Hezbollah and Hamas to threaten and attack Israel, and it equipped the sanctioned Hashd factions in Iraq to attack U.S. units and threaten the elected government. So, again, any possible deal must call for inspection, verification and punitive actions in instances of violation.

Lastly, the cancerous regional proxy network that Iran has armed, trained and equipped for a decade must be cut off from the country’s financial and military support. It must also be delinked from extrajudicial governance in Lebanon, Yemen and Iraq. These proxies — Hezbollah, Hamas and the Houthis — have been defeated and deterred from continued activity since Oct. 7, 2024, but only for the moment. Without any formal termination of support, they will undoubtedly return. Once again, the message to Iran must be to break with the proxies or face punitive action.

Without concrete movement on these three elements, Khamenei and his regime face a bleak future.

But even if this set of conditions is offered, expect the regime to react in its normal manner: delay, deflect, deny — diplomatic tools that have been successfully used by brilliant Iranian negotiators over the years. This stratagem must be quickly brushed aside by America’s interlocutors, who won’t be there to please or appease but to impose.

In short, such an offer from the U.S. would mean a perpetuation of the regime, relief from sanctions, help with runaway inflation, and assistance in facing a climate catastrophe. But it would also come at a cost and with a choice — for Khamenei, either a lifeline or a noose.

In all of this, the Iranian leader would do well to consider Trump’s first term, when the U.S. took the feared Iranian Gen. Qassem Soleimani off the battlefield with a drone in 2020, as well as his ongoing second term, particularly the 12-day war of 2025 and the recent apprehension of Venezuelan dictator Nicolás Maduro by U.S. special forces.

There’s plenty of room in Maduro’s wing at the Brooklyn Detention Center for IRGC Deputy Commander-in-Chief Ahmad Vahidi and his accomplice Esmail Qaani, or side by side with Soleimani. Moreover, Iran has yet to rebuild its air-defense network after its disembowelment last year, and it still has hundreds of military and infrastructure targets that U.S., Israeli and other coalition pilots are ready to attack.

Khamenei would also do well to remember that even if the protest is put down by killings, its underlying causes — inflation, sclerotic social norms and crippling water rationing — will remain.

Trump has told Iranian protestors that “help is on the way” — and that could be interpreted as an offer to the regime as well. But Khamenei must accept he faces a U.S. president who is willing to ignore decades of diplomatic niceties and one-sided concessions in favor of finishing the job of destroying Iran’s nuclear program.

One can only hope wisdom carries the day at Beit-e Rahbari, and that finally this time is different.