The U.S. intervention in Venezuela is forcing a geopolitical reckoning — in Washington, throughout the Western Hemisphere and around the world.

President Donald Trump’s decision to launch a surprise military action and extract Nicolás Maduro ended a years-long standoff with Caracas in a matter of hours — but the move has opened up a new set of questions. What does this mean for the rest of Latin America? How will adversaries like Russia, China and Iran recalibrate? What will be the impact on the global energy markets? And does this mark a permanent shift in the U.S.’s projection of power?

In his statements since the operation began,Trump has provided few hints about what comes next beyond the assurance that the operation was decisive and the United States will be “running” Venezuela for at least some period of time.

To assess how the fall of Maduro — and the manner of his removal — could reshape global politics, POLITICO Magazine asked a range of experts, from regional analysts to national security veterans, to weigh in on this decision by the Trump administration and forecast how it will reverberate in the rest of the world.

Here’s what they said.

‘The axis of authoritarians… may feel additional urgency to prove their value’

BY RYAN BERG

Ryan Berg is director of the Americas Program and head of the Future of Venezuela Initiative at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

The Trump administration is serious about the Western Hemisphere strategy outlined in the recent National Security Strategy document, with a Trump Corollary over the hemisphere. The fact that President Trump launched this operation hours after Nicolás Maduro met with China’s special envoy sends a clear and unequivocal message to China and its role in the Americas. It also sends the message that the ‘axis of authoritarians’ is strong during peacetime, but not decisive for one another in moments of greatest need, when it comes to questions of regime security. Trump already pointed it out in his remarks on the military operation today, where he specifically drew attention to other successful U.S. attacks on adversaries, including against Iran. The axis of authoritarians, and especially Russia and China, may feel additional urgency to prove their value in the face of pressure against their allies such as Venezuela.

‘One could easily imagine a Chinese indictment of a Taiwanese leader’

BY JUSTIN LOGAN

Justin Logan is the director of defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute.

The geopolitical impacts of the Venezuela raid and the capture of its dictator Nicolás Maduro and his wife will be limited because its impact on the global balance of power will be limited. Still, one can foresee two small but potentially significant consequences.

First, other major powers could seize in the future on the administration’s claim that the attack was legal because Maduro was under indictment in the United States. One could easily imagine a Chinese indictment of a Taiwanese leader, under specious grounds, as lubricating a Chinese attack on Taiwan. Then the United States would be left arguing the analogy is unsound because the U.S. indictment was legitimate, whereas the Chinese indictment was not.

Second, President Trump prides himself on being unpredictable, and this attack will only deepen other countries’ belief in the volatility of U.S. foreign policy. Leaders crosswise with the Trump administration will likely think more carefully about how they can hedge their bets, whether that means developing closer relationships with China or Russia, or coming up with better and clearer plans for avoiding similar campaigns as the one in Caracas. More fear will be coupled with more careful thinking about how to counter a capricious United States.

‘Without Venezuelan oil, Cuba’s political system will finally collapse’

BY STEPHEN KINZER

Stephen Kinzer, a longtime foreign correspondent for the New York Times, is a senior fellow at the Watson School for International and Public Affairs at Brown University.

Trump is the most resource-focused American president since Eisenhower. He sees Venezuelan oil as a grand prize. When he demands that countries stop buying oil from Russia and Iran, and they ask him what alternative they have, he would love to be able to answer: “I’ll give you oil from Venezuela.” It is a considerable geopolitical weapon.

That, however, is a long-term dream. Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s motive is more immediate. He comes out of a communal background centered on a 65-year-old dream: overthrowing Fidel Castro. The fact that Castro is dead doesn’t matter — Rubio and his Florida cheering squad still want to destroy him. They see intervention in Venezuela as important not for itself, but as a way to cut Cuba’s lifeline. Rubio hopes that without Venezuelan oil, Cuba’s political system will finally collapse. That would turn both countries into submissive clients — or into bloody battlegrounds where a new generation of Latin Americans will seek to defy what the Nicaraguan rebel leader Augusto César Sandino called “the eagle with larcenous claws.”

‘A synonym for overconfident failure’

BY EMMA ASHFORD

Emma Ashford is a senior fellow with the Reimagining U.S. Grand Strategy program at the Stimson Center.

America has always made an exception for Latin America. Even as the founding fathers clearly stated their desire for the United States to stand apart from European power politics, they acknowledged America’s special interests — and willingness to act upon them — in its own hemisphere. Later presidents would claim the mantle of the Monroe Doctrine to justify repeated military interventions and regime change in the region. The seizure of Nicolás Maduro from his country in the middle of the night might have violated various domestic and international laws. But it was not at odds with America’s historic willingness to bend all kinds of rules in its own backyard.

In geopolitical terms, then, the most important aspect of this strike may be to show that the administration is serious about the so-called “Trump Corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine. Outlined in the recently published National Security Strategy, this corollary promises to “deny non-Hemispheric competitors” like Russia and China access to the region. That message could not have been displayed more clearly than last night, when a Chinese delegation, recently arrived for talks with Maduro, was awakened like the rest of Caracas by the sound of airstrikes. America is reasserting its traditional role in the region and signaling that the Western Hemisphere is closed to outside powers.

In reality, this might end up signaling instead that America’s addiction to regime change is just as disastrous in the Western hemisphere as it was in the Middle East. Right now, the Trump administration’s plan appears to be a relatively modest leadership change: the removal of Maduro and his replacement with someone inside the regime who will be more cooperative. Donald Trump explicitly rejected the notion of democratic regime change when he told journalists that María Corina Machado could not summon enough support to lead the country. But this vision of a U.S.-coopted government in Venezuela could very easily go wrong, from a military coup to open chaos in the streets and a much larger U.S. intervention. It is simply too early to tell — and history suggests that our ability to predict the aftermath of targeted regime change is poor.

If the worst does happen, what then will be the message received in Beijing or Moscow? Will it be a message of strength and security, one that encourages them not to meddle in Latin America? Or will it instead be a reminder that American presidents can always be trusted to act against our own worst interests? If Donald Trump’s luck does not hold, then the “Trump Corollary” may end up as little more than a synonym for overconfident failure.

‘Longer term, Venezuela could play a much bigger role in the global oil market’

BY BOB MCNALLY

Bob McNally is the founder and president of Rapidan Energy Group, an independent energy market, policy and geopolitical analysis firm based in the Washington, D.C. area.

From an energy perspective, near-term U.S. pressure on Venezuela is a relatively minor factor. Global oil markets have ample supply, with Venezuela contributing only about 4 percent to China’s and the U.S.’s crude imports. Yes, Chinese “teapot” refineries would lament the loss of cheap barrels if that happened. But it’s not a major threat to China’s oil sector, much less its economy or national security.

Longer term, Venezuela could play a much bigger role in the global oil market given its enormous, if costly, reserves. However, it is essential to recognize that achieving long-term potential will be a long and winding road, with numerous political, commercial and market risks. Many ask us if Washington would ask a post-Maduro, pro-U.S. government to leave OPEC. Venezuela was a founder of OPEC. We doubt it because it would anger Saudi Arabia and the UAE, and in 2020, President Trump learned to appreciate OPEC’s supply management after he begged it to cut production to save U.S. shale.

Rapidan has told clients for weeks that odds were 70 percent that President Trump would successfully replace or co-opt Maduro. While Maduro was successfully removed to U.S. custody, this transition is not yet complete. It’s unclear who will succeed the current government, when it will happen, and how it will relate to the U.S., other alliances, and energy markets.

What remains clear is that President Trump is determined to make Venezuela his first concrete manifestation of the Trump Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine. U.S. pressure and diplomacy will continue until the U.S. is satisfied that its foreign policy, national security, anti-narcotics and energy interests are met.

‘Threaten the leaders of recalcitrant allies and weak adversaries’

BY DANIEL W. DREZNER

Daniel W. Drezner is academic dean and distinguished professor of international politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. He is the author of Drezner’s World.

In the summer of 2024, I cautioned in POLITICO that a second Trump administration would be likely to increase, not decrease U.S. military adventurism: “Even though the term is directed at him a lot, Trump is not an isolationist — he is a mercantilist who prefers using force in this hemisphere.” The use of force to depose Nicolás Maduro is a pretty strong data point supporting this contention.

Going forward, one interesting effect to look for from this U.S. action is how other heads of state and heads of government respond. A constant of Trump’s foreign policy has been to focus on pressuring or flattering the individual leaders of other countries. Some of my colleagues have labeled this a “neo-royalist” worldview, focusing on individual elites rather than laws or institutions. The obvious implication of this action is that the Trump administration is unconcerned with international laws or norms when it comes to attacking foreign leaders.

I strongly suspect that the Trump administration will use this Maduro action to threaten the leaders of recalcitrant allies and weak adversaries that they might be next on the chopping block — and such threats might actually work. Just as U.S. members of Congress have expressed fears of personal attacks during the Trump years due to his violent rhetoric, countries that lack great power patronage might prove to be more pliable to continued U.S. pressure. Of course, the other effect could be for other country leaders to bind themselves more closely to other great powers as a form of political insurance against the United States. Stay tuned.

‘Complicating his own grand strategy’

BY DANIEL R. DEPETRIS

Daniel R. DePetris is a fellow at Defense Priorities and a syndicated foreign affairs columnist at the Chicago Tribune.

The nighttime U.S. air assault and special operations raid that nabbed Venezuelan dictator Nicolás Maduro and his wife was impeccably planned and executed. President Trump is rightly proud of the results; Maduro, a man who outlasted the first Trump administration’s maximum pressure strategy, will soon find himself in a U.S. courtroom as a criminal defendant.

If Maduro’s capture tells us anything, it’s that Trump is dead serious about implementing his so-called Trump Corollary in the Western Hemisphere. In less than a year, Latin America has transformed from a perpetual backwater of U.S. grand strategy to one of its main theaters. The Trump administration’s National Security Strategy codified the Western Hemisphere as not only a core U.S. security priority but Washington’s exclusive domain, where non-hemispheric powers aren’t welcome. Latin American leaders who cater to U.S. demands like Argentine President Javier Milei and El Salvadoran President Nayib Bukele will be rewarded; those who don’t, like Maduro, Cuban President Miguel Díaz-Canel and Colombian President Gustavo Petro, will face intense U.S. economic and rhetorical pressure — including the looming threat of a snatch-and-grab operation in the middle of the night. The current U.S. policy is driven less by spreading democracy and instituting regional economic integration and more about exercising raw power.

Of course, the United States is not the first country on the planet to want to preserve its advantage in its own near-abroad — and yet maintaining hegemony through coercion is not without costs. Even small powers don’t like to be dictated to, and if the pressure gets too intense or if the demands become intolerable, they may choose to enact strategies of hedging or outright balancing to defend their own security interests. With respect to Latin America specifically, the most likely alternative waiting in the wings is China, which is already the top trading partner of choice for many of the region’s governments. It would be the height of irony, then, if Trump’s military operation in Venezuela winds up complicating his own grand strategy over the long term.

‘A mad dash for Venezuela’s resources’

BY LELAND LAZARUS

Leland Lazarus is founder and CEO of Lazarus Consulting, a geopolitical risk firm focusing on U.S.-China and China-Latin America relations.

The U.S. ousting Maduro potentially kills multiple birds with one stone: It could increase oil supply in the U.S. and reduce oil prices, curb drug trafficking, dislodge China, Russia, and Iran from their strategic beachhead, and weaken other regional adversaries like Cuba and Nicaragua.

But it may also precipitate a mad dash for Venezuela’s resources. China in particular risks losing oil flows, more than $60 billion in sunk loans, and one of its reliable political footholds in the Western Hemisphere. Two specific examples illustrate this: The House Select Committee on the CCP recently identified that the oil tanker SKIPPER, seized by the U.S., had ties to China. And in November last year at a business forum in Miami, María Corina Machado said that, in 2012, China’s state-owned CITIC company conducted the only full geological survey of Venezuela’s critical mineral resources, and it is the only company that has that survey to this day.

I’m concerned that the U.S. ostentatiously invoking the Monroe Doctrine may actually cause pushback across the region, because local people don’t want a return to unfettered U.S. imperialism. Moreover, I’m concerned that the administration doesn’t have a well thought out Day After plan. President Trump said the U.S. will “run” Venezuela until there’s a peaceful transition. How do we ensure that Machado doesn’t return to a Venezuela full of factions? What if members of Maduro’s inner circle engage in a protracted guerrilla war, with weapons supplied from Cuba, Nicaragua, China, Russia or Iran? These are issues that must be worked out now to avoid an Iraq or Afghanistan repeat.

‘Ukraine and Taiwan should be very afraid’

BY RYAN CROCKER

Ryan Crocker was a career foreign service officer who served as ambassador in Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, Syria, Kuwait and Lebanon.

The immediate comparison that comes to mind is Operation Just Cause, the overthrow and arrest of Manuel Antonio Noriega in Panama in December 1989. A more costly military operation (23 U.S. soldiers killed in action), but with a clear outcome: Within a week, the Panamanian electoral commission had declared the winning candidate in the contested May 1989 elections as the rightful president.

It is much less clear what happens next in Venezuela. Maduro is gone, but the regime endures — his vice president has been sworn in as president. With no boots on the ground, how do we shape events?

The international reaction to Operation Just Cause included a UN Security Council resolution of condemnation introduced by the Soviet Union, supported by China — and vetoed by the U.S., UK and France. It will be very interesting to see what happens this time. If Russia and China are silent, it will be a huge step towards the emergence of a balance-of-power world. Ukraine and Taiwan should be very afraid.

‘Latin countries will reassess their very limited ability to deter U.S. military attacks’

BY STEPHEN MCFARLAND

Stephen McFarland is a retired U.S. diplomat who was ambassador to Guatemala. He served twice in Venezuela, and in Iraq and Afghanistan, and in eight other posts in Latin America.

This is a watershed moment for U.S. relations with Latin America, a new “Monroe Doctrine” era. The U.S. did not just capture Maduro and sweep aside the Venezuelan military; it also announced the U.S. will “run” Venezuela until there is a democratic transition, recover property and interests that Venezuela seized from U.S. companies, and rebuild the oil industry there to protect U.S. access to energy. Inexplicably, President Trump has also minimized the role in the future Venezuelan government of María Corina Machado, who had unified the opposition and led it to victory in the 2024 presidential elections. The message is that the U.S. will do whatever it wants in the hemisphere to maintain access to natural resources, and that it has the military force to do so.

In response, there is little most countries in the region — which largely oppose Maduro, but worry about their sovereignty in the face of an omnipotent U.S. — can do right now beyond criticize the Trump administration. Indeed, some nations will hope for a reduction in Venezuelan migration to their countries, while others will keep quiet to avoid U.S. trade sanctions. Cuba and Nicaragua must fear they are next on the regime change list, and Colombia and Mexico must fear U.S. military attacks against narcotics traffickers. Outside the continent, Russia might seek to trade acquiescence on Venezuela for U.S. accommodation regarding Ukraine.

Longer term, Latin countries will reassess their very limited ability to deter U.S. military attacks; a generation from now, the region may be less beholden to the U.S. and have more, not fewer, links to extra-regional players. A continent that fears the U.S., rather than sees it as a powerful partner, bodes ill for America’s long-term strategic interests.

A critical variable is whether the U.S. can direct a stable and sustainable democratic transition in Venezuela. Will Venezuelan migration drop, and will emigres return to Venezuela? Will Venezuelans accept the U.S. rules for oil production and exports? Regime change and nation rebuilding are extremely difficult, prolonged and require much more than military supremacy. If the U.S. does not achieve a democratic transition in Venezuela, if it gets bogged down like in Iraq and Afghanistan and is distracted from other hemispheric issues, it will have lost its big bet on regime change in Venezuela.

‘The U.S. just ceded the high ground to rally world support to defend Taiwan’

BY CURT MILLS

Curt Mills is executive director of The American Conservative magazine.

Probably the most significant result of Jan. 3 is that the U.S. just ceded the high ground to rally world support to defend Taiwan. It is pretty telling that Trump’s White House bled allies even on the global hard right with this maneuver.

What is also distressing is the clear lack of a plan from the administration. Speaking at Mar-a-Lago, President Trump seemed open to allowing heretofore Maduro’s henchwoman, the apparent acting President Delcy Rodríguez, to succeed Maduro. But Rodriguez seemed less than cooperative, demanding her boss’s release and affirming that only Maduro is legitimate in her eyes. Does America now have to go back in?

Finally, it was depressing to hear how much the Global War on Terror legacy hangs over the American military. It’s all well and good that the U.S. perfected special operations during the Middle East wars, as the Joint Chiefs chair Dan Caine said, but America famously also lost those wars in the end despite all the tactical successes. The only redeemable macro justification for hawkishness in Latin America is driving China out of our backyard. But, bafflingly, Trump promised China: “There’s not gonna be a problem. They’re gonna get oil.” Oil, that is, presumably plundered from the Venezuelan people.

‘Too early for anyone to celebrate a potential oil-backed resource boom’

BY DIEGO RIVERA RIVOTA

Diego Rivera Rivota is a Senior Research Associate at the Center on Global Energy Policy at Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs.

The U.S.-led operation that occurred today in central Caracas and in some key Venezuelan security facilities is nothing short of historical. While it indeed represents the end of the Nicolás Maduro regime, we don’t know who will rule Venezuela from now — whether it’s a U.S.-led transitional regime, Vice President Delcy Rodríguez and other Maduro’s apparatchiks, or somebody else.

In this context, the geopolitical implications of extracting the leader — albeit illegitimate and deeply unpopular — of the country with the largest crude oil reserves are quite complicated and may have deeper ramifications across the globe. Indeed, today’s and the coming days’ developments may be received in other capitals as a signal of a transition to an international system in which powerful countries can run spheres of influence, as happened in most of the 19th and the early 20th century.

With regards to global oil markets, it is important to note that holding the largest reserves of crude oil by no means translates into the ability to swiftly bring enormous production of oil to the world’s market. Venezuela’s oil production peaked in 1997 at over 3.5 million barrels per day , only to collapse to 0.9 million barrels per day in 2024, following years of mismanagement and corruption. Reversing an almost two-decade-long trend is not impossible, but it would require enormous amounts of financing, clear incentives for oil and gas companies, and time. This would only be possible with some minimal preconditions of governance, stability and clear incentives for companies to invest in Venezuela — something easier to say than to do.

On top of that, the world has also changed since 2006. The global demand outlook looks very uncertain, with very limited growth and plateauing sometime in the 2030s. On top of that, to stay only in the Latin American neighborhood, Brazil and Argentina have significantly increased their oil production in the last five years, while Guyana has emerged from zero to almost surpassing Venezuela’s current production, according to preliminary data from 2025. In sum, it would be too early for anyone to celebrate a potential oil-backed resource boom for the U.S.

‘Strong incentives to quietly appease Washington’

MIE HOEJRIS DAHL

Mie Hoejris Dahl is a Danish freelance journalist based in Mexico City and Bogotá. She has reported inside Venezuela and covered the 2024 presidential elections and its aftermath.

The U.S. attacks on Venezuela and capture of Nicolás Maduro on January 3 sent shock waves through Latin America and the world. Within hours, world leaders began staking out positions that laid bare growing dividing lines. The presidents of Colombia, Brazil and Mexico all rushed to condemn the U.S. attacks on Venezuela. They have each been on the receiving end of U.S. President Donald Trump’s threats and rhetorical bullying in recent months — and may worry about being next, in one form or another.

The U.S. attacks on Venezuela have sharpened global and regional divides. One line runs between authoritarian allies of Maduro — such as Cuba, Iran and Russia — that denounce the operation as imperial overreach, and democratic actors that long pushed for an end to Maduro’s rule but are uneasy with regime change by force. Within Latin America, another divide is emerging between Trump‑aligned, mostly right‑wing leaders who applaud the ouster, and non‑aligned — often leftist — presidents who condemn it on sovereignty grounds.

In the weeks ahead, Latin American leaders — especially those not politically aligned with Trump — are likely to double down on calls for peace, respect for sovereignty and adherence to international law in multilateral forums. At the same time, even the loudest critics of the operation will have strong incentives to quietly appease Washington. Many Latin American governments are likely to invest more in counternarcotics and migration control.